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Unlike the previous entries in this section, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) are not mechanisms for the storage and exchange of AAA information Instead, they provide the means to authenticate yourself to the device with which you are exchanging information and for you to authenticate that device Authentication is based on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) The basis of the security of PKI is that there is a hierarchy of trust At the top of the hierarchy is a root Certi cate Authority (CA), which is considered to be trusted absolutely There are a number of global root CAs, whose certi cates are distributed with many operating systems and applications (particularly web browsers) You can pay a root CA for presigned certi cates or to get locally generated certi cates signed by these global root CAs.

Per Serving: (1cup/250 ml, 132 g) Calories 226; Available carbohydrate 30 g; Carbohydrate 32 g; Fibre 2 g; Fat 9 g; Protein 4 g; Cholesterol 0 mg; Phosphorus 106 mg; Potassium 175 mg; Sodium 239 mg. 1 Serving = 2 Carbohydrate Choices

However, many enterprises and some service providers run their own, internal CAs, whose certi cates are only distributed to hosts that operate within the boundaries of that network That CA signs certi cates for servers, network devices and individuals within the organization exclusively for the purpose of authenticating them to each other This CA can operate independently of the global hierarchy by simply selfsigning its own certi cate or it can have its CA certi cate signed by one of the global root CAs When two entities (individuals, hosts, organizations) wish to authenticate each other, they exchange certi cates When you try to authenticate your peer, you follow the chain of certi cates back up the hierarchy of trust from the signed certi cate you have received to a point you trust Generally, this is a chain of just two certi cates (ie.

the certi cate you receive will have been signed by a root CA) SSL/TLS is widely used on web servers, and less widely used on mail servers, as a mechanism for authenticating the server to the client This is most widely used on web servers where the server is being used to take credit card details so that the user can be sure that the server taking their details belongs to the organization to which it purports to belong In environments where HTML and XML are used to monitor and maintain network devices, SSL/TLS provides a mechanism for both parties to authenticate each other In most cases, it is tricky for a rogue device to masquerade as a valid device However, it is possible It is also eminently possible for a rogue user to masquerade as a valid user Running a CA is a dif cult task.

correction, or error vector , is used to adjust the position of the GPS receiver on the road segment, but only when the error vector is known to be of high quality (residual values are low). This error vector is calculated using a least squares estimation, based on the last n receiver positions, where n may range from as few as 5 epochs to 30 or more, depending on the road geometry. The advantage of formal methods is that quality measures can be derived and used to place con dence bounds for rigorous decision-making (for example, to reject road centre-lines that fail a particular hypothesis test). Formal methods also provide an insight into the relative importance of factors, which can improve the procedure (e.g. data rates and road geometry).

It can place a particularly heavy administrative load on the network operator if each user is required to authenticate himself using a certi cate Every user would require a personal certi cate These certi cates can be dif cult to transport between hosts if, for example, the user changes their laptop or if they temporarily need to use a different workstation However, if this is the type of authentication required, the only alternative is to buy a certi cate for each user from a global root CA Even with bulk discounts, this could be prohibitively expensive As usual, you are left with a compromise You could internally manage a CA, with the attendant administrative load and costs or pay a third party for the numerous individual certi cates from a CA As always, you must make your own compromises between cost, complexity and security..